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FAIR WARNING: THE DETERIORATION OF
SCIENTER UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL STATUTES
M. Diane Barber*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recently enacted Clean Air Act1 (CAA), like other environmen-
tal statutes, 2 provides for a regulatory regime to be enforced not only by
civil penalties,3 but by criminal penalties, including incarceration. Con-
gress created two new air pollution crimes under this Act: negligent en-
dangerment4 and knowing endangerment.5 Negligent endangerment
carries a punishment of a fine or up to one year in prison; knowing en-
dangerment carries a fine or up to fifteen years in prison.
Based on the legislative history it appears that congressional leaders
deeply believed that the use of powerful enforcement provisions was cru-
cial to successful implementation of the clean air goals. As Senator John
Chafee vehemently declared:
The whole guts of the clean air legislation revolves around the
permit and enforcement provisions. If we want to do some-
thing about the better health of the citizens of our country, or
to improve the environment, the land that we love, and pass it
on in better shape to our children and grandchildren, then it is
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Houston, Bates College of Law and South
Texas College of Law, Houston; J.D., 1972, Albany Law School, Union University; LL.M.
Candidate in Energy, Natural Resources and Environmental Law, 1992, University of Hous-
ton, Bates College of Law.
1. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2672 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
2. As one commentator has noted:
With respect to criminal enforcement, the government believed that criminal penal-
ties under the Act should be increased in many cases from the misdemeanor level to
the felony level to bring the Act into line with other environmental statutes. For
these reasons and others, the enforcement title included in the Administration bill
was designed to "upgrade" the Act and to ensure that it contained the same kinds of
enforcement powers, both civil and criminal, granted to the government under other
comparable environmental statutes.
Stephen E. Roady, Permitting and Enforcement Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
21 ENvT.. L. RFP. 10,178, at 10,196 (1991).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
4. Id. § 7413(c)(4).
5. Id. § 7413(c)(5).
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absolutely essential that there be strong permit provisions, and
that there be strong enforcement provisions in this Bill.6
Consequently, in addition to the two new crimes, fines or jail terms
may be sought for deliberate inaccuracies in recordkeeping, reporting
and monitoring and for deliberate failure to pay fees in violation of the
Act.7 Not surprisingly, Congress intensely debated the breadth of these
enforcement provisions.' The House Bill specifically prohibited applica-
tion of section 113 to "de minimis or technical violations, as determined
by the Administrator." 9 The Conference Committee deleted this lan-
guage in an apparent effort not to dilute the enforcement process.10 The
conferees, however, intended "to provide the Administrator with
prosecutional discretion to decide not to seek sanctions under section 113
for de minimis and technical violations in civil and criminal matters."11
It is not unusual for Congress to write legislation whereby "penalties
serve as effective means of regulation"' 2 but which creates difficult en-
forcement issues that are left to the forbearance of the judicial system.
Indeed, as Justice Frankfurter noted in United States v. Dotterweich :1 In
such matters "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial
judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted." 4 That this
approach created discomfort in Congress is consistent with the fury with
which Justice Murphy wrote his dissent, attacking such a situation as
"precisely what our constitutional system ought to avoid.""
Congress also was concerned that the net of criminal liability not
sweep in innocent employees, particularly in the onerous new endanger-
ment sections.16 Amidst criticism by the Department of Justice, 7 House
language limiting "person" was eliminated. I8 Instead, the statutory term
6. 136 CONG. RnC. S3175 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)-(3).
8. Roady, supra note 2, at 10,201.
9. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1989).
10. "The Conference Committee concluded that this language could create mischief by
affording sources the opportunity to delay enforcement actions merely by demanding that the
administrator issue a finding that the alleged violation was not, in fact, de minimis or technical
before proceeding with enforcement." Roady, supra note 2, at 10,201.
11. H.R. REP. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1990) (statement of House Managers).
12. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943).
13. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
14. d at 285; see also United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir.
1984) (quoting portions of this language), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
15. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 292 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
16. 136 CONG. REc. S16,951-52 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Chafee & Sen.
Baucus).
17. Roady, supra note 2, at 10,202.
18. 136 CONG. Rnc. S16,952 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
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"knowing and willful" conduct was deemed sufficient protection for the
innocent.' 9 However, the difficult question of the standard of liability in
the employer-employee arena was left unresolved. This was further con-
fused by the Statement of Senate Managers declaring that the govern-
ment need not prove the accused had specific knowledge of a violation of
the Act to establish the element of "knowing and willful"; that the ac-
cused knew the action to be generally unlawful would establish that ele-
ment of the crime.20 This position of the Managers is consistent with
recent court decisions interpreting the scope of "knowingly" under envi-
ronmental statutes.21 It nonetheless places trial judges and juries in the
precarious situation of finding a "knowing and willful" violation, subject
to imprisonment, in the context of blurry criminal statutes. Thus far,
this has not troubled the courts, which in interpreting environmental
statutes, find support in Dotterweich, an early Food and Drug Act case.
In that case the Supreme Court stated:
Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus
penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing
may be totally wanting. Balancing relative hardships, Congress
has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the op-
portunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions
imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit
commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent
public who are wholly helpless.22
As corporate managers throughout the country grapple with loom-
ing compliance schedules of the CAA amendments, there is an undercur-
rent of fear. The notion that officers or employees may face
imprisonment for failure to comply with a highly technical regulatory
statute has engendered profound confusion as potential violators struggle
to understand the applicability of the "knowing and willful" language.
Legal commentators have termed the standard of culpability in environ-
mental cases to be "unsettled," and at best a "hybrid."23 Vulnerability to
criminal penalties may engender increased statutory compliance, but it
may also create pernicious legal havoc if that vulnerability is not treated
with the consideration our legal system has repeatedly paid to what Chief
19. Id.
20. IaL There is no Statement of House Managers on this point. But see id. H3677 (daily
ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fields).
21. See infra notes 197-291 and accompanying text.
22. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85.
23. See infra note 320.
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Justice Marshall so aptly called "the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals."'24
This Article examines the origins and growth of public welfare of-
fenses, crimes that generally do not require scienter2" either statutorily or
implicitly. Further, it reviews the application of the public welfare of-
fense doctrine to early environmental crimes. This Article then explores
the continued judicial application of that doctrine to recently created
criminal environmental statutes that contain a statutory requirement of
scienter. Based on an analysis of the latest environmental crimes con-
tained in the CAA, it concludes that continued application of the public
welfare offense doctrine to justify regulatory purpose must falter.
Imposition of serious penalties in a congressional attempt to deter
environmental crimes stretches the elasticity of that doctrine to a point of
near collapse. The judicial interpretation burden that will result from the
CAA will overburden the doctrine. Environmental crimes must be rec-
ognized as unique, and Congress must provide an appropriate criminal
statutory framework. Congress has reshaped criminal environmental vi-
olations so that they no longer conform to the traditionally gentle de-
scription of public welfare offenses. The law must give fair warning to
corporate managers that freedom may be the price for violating the laws.
The Constitution mandates this.
II. MENS REA
A. Common-Law Origins
It is well recognized in Anglo-Saxon law that acts punishable as
crimes require proof of mens rea.26 That requirement sprung naturally
from the purpose of early criminal law: maintain the peace by punishing
the willful offender.27 As the Supreme Court has noted, "'[h]istorically,
24. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
25. "The term [scienter] is frequently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge."
BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990).
26. William Blackstone, in his classic commentary, declared that "to constitute a crime
against human laws, there must be first, a vicious will." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *21. For a thorough review of the history of early crimi-
nal laws, see Jerome Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. PA. L., REV. 549
(1941).
27. See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 68 (1933).
Professor Sayre states:
The original objective of the criminal law was to keep the peace; and under the strong
church influence of the Middle Ages its function was extended to curb moral delin-
quencies of one kind or another. For those purposes it developed a suitable proce-
dure, requiring proof of moral blameworthiness or a criminal intent.
[Vol. 26:105
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our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vi-
cious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between
doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.' ,28
Grounded firmly in common law, this principle was often read into
early codified crimes if the statute was silent.2 9 Indeed, as Justice Jack-
son noted in a lengthy review of that subject:
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their
enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that
the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but
merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the
offense that it required no statutory affirmation. 0
There was, however, an exception to this time-honored concept. Indus-
trialization and the growth of dense and complex urban centers forced a
new form of regulation upon citizens. A group of "offenses punishable
without regard to any mental element"31 developed in England and the
United States independently over a period of seventy-five years. Profes-
sor Francis Sayre, in his review of this modem trend, termed them "pub-
lic welfare offenses." 2
B. Public Welfare Origins
The need to regulate the sale of liquor and adulterated milk led
Massachusetts state courts to uphold convictions under statutes that re-
quired no mens rea. 1 Interestingly, in the seminal case of Common-
28. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952) (quoting Roscoe Pound,
Introduction to FRANcIs SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW xxxvi-xxxvii (1927)).
29. Id at 252.
30. Id. For a review of mens rea and public welfare offenses, see id at 250-63.
31. Sayre, supra note 27, at 56-67. Sayre further notes that prior to this development in
the middle of the 19th Century, nuisance cases provided the few instances in which mens rea
was not required. Id. at 56; see also Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II,
43 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 986 (1943) (stating that "public welfare offenses" date from middle of
last century).
32. Sayre, supra note 27, at 56 n.5. "The term 'public welfare offenses' is used to denote
the group of police offenses and criminal nuisances, punishable irrespective of the actor's state
of mind, which have been developing in England and America." Id.
33. See Commonwealth v. Waite, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 264 (1865); Commonwealth v.
Nichols, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 199 (1865); Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 489
(1864); Commonwealth v. Boynton, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 160 (1861).
In England this movement was evolving simultaneously. The first case, Regina v. Wood-
row, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846), involved the sale of adulterated tobacco. The court re-
marked upon the difficulty of proving mens rea in such situations, as well as the requirement in
matters of public health for persons to be cognizant of the nature of the goods. Id at 912-13.
For an extensive review of the development of public welfare offenses in England, see Sayre,
supra note 27, at 56-62. An early Connecticut case also dealt with the liquor issue. See Barnes
v. State, 19 Conn. 397 (1849).
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wealth v. Boynton,34 the court upheld a conviction and placed the burden
of discovering the nature of the suspect material upon the defendant."
The court held that "if the defendant purposely sold the liquor, which
was in fact intoxicating, he was bound at his peril to ascertain the nature
of the article which he sold."
36
Following these cases, the concept of punishable offenses regardless
of criminal intent was widely adopted by other states and incorporated
into criminal law treatises.37 This development is largely attributed to
the recognition by legislatures of a duty to protect the public health and
welfare in an increasingly complex and congested modem world .3  It is
significant that with the simultaneous recognition by the legal system
that society was best protected through regulatory measures punishable
as criminal offenses, criminologists were arguing that the limited thrust
of the criminal system, the punishment of errant individuals, should be
broadened to reflect new views of protecting society as a whole. 39 In-
deed, the first thirty years of the century were marked by what Sayre
describes as two pronounced movements:
(1) the shift of emphasis from the protection of individual in-
terests which marked nineteenth century criminal adminis-
tration to the protection of public and social interests, and
(2) the growing utilization of the criminal law machinery to
enforce, not only the true crimes of the classic law, but also
34. 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 160 (1861).
35. Id at 160.
36. Id (emphasis added). The court specifically reiterated this legal principle in a subse-
quent liquor case, Commonwealth v. Goodman, 97 Mass. 117 (1867). The court upheld a
conviction, noting that "a person is bound to know or ascertain at his peril" whether his
liquors were intoxicating. Id at 119. This duty to ascertain the facts was extended by the
courts to adulterated milk cases as well as various other police-type statutes. See Sayre, supra
note 27, at 65.
37. See Sayre, supra note 27, at 66. See id at 66 n.43 for various state holdings. See id. at
66 n.44 for a discussion of the progressive adoption of this principle in two criminal law
treatises.
38. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-60; see also Sayre, supra note 27, at
66-70 (examining transformation of criminal law system and inability of modem courts to
effectively handle vast influx of petty offenses if mental state is considered).
39. Sayre, supra note 27, at 68. As Professor Sayre noted in 1933:
We are thinking today more of the protection of social and public interests; and
coincident with the swinging of the pendulum in the field of legal administration in
this direction modem criminologists are teaching that the objective underlying cor-
rectional treatment should change from the barren aim of punishing human beings to
the fruitful one of protecting social interests.
[Vol. 26:105
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a new type of twentieth century regulatory measure involv-
ing no moral delinquency.'
The legal system could embrace these movements because early
public welfare offenses did not generally involve imprisonment.4' Often
termed "police regulations" or "police offenses," this group regulated li-
quor sales, adulterated food and drug sales, narcotic sales, misbranded
articles, traffic, motor vehicles and criminal nuisances including injuries
to public health and safety.42 Such crimes were not mala in se; they were
not true crimes because the act that constituted the offense was not in-
trinsically wrong.43 As late as the 1940s, there was hesitation to term
public welfare crimes as mala prohibita, although some courts advocated
that distinction.4'
C. "At Peril" Doctrine
It was thus recognized by the courts at the turn of the century that
an "at peril" doctrine applied to certain acts regulated by statute for the
welfare of the public. Based on what the Boynton court termed the "sal-
utary rule" that "every man is presumed to know the law," the courts
imposed an affirmative duty on the actor in regulated situations to learn
the facts.45 In the 1909 case of Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,' the
Supreme Court recognized the "at peril" doctrine as a legitimate exten-
sion of police power. The Court noted:
[T]he legislation was in effect an exercise of the police power.
... Public policy may require that in the prohibition or punish-
ment of particular acts it may be provided that he who shall do
them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in
defense good faith or ignorance. 47
Stripped of the defenses of good faith and ignorance, the actor was
thereby succinctly "at peril." Mens rea was not to be considered.
40. Id. at 67.
41. Id at 72; see Morissette, 342 U.S. at 258.
42. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 262 n.20. See Sayre, supra note 27, at 84-88 for expanded case
listings supporting this position.
43. Crimes mala in se have been defined as "intrinsically wrong," while crimes mala
prohibita are "wrong" only because they are legally prohibited. Hall, supra note 26, at 563-64.
44. Hall declares that "in the 'public welfare regulation' analogy, the distinction should be
between criminal and non-criminal." Id. at 567.
45. Commonwealth v. Boynton, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 160, 160 (1861).
46. 218 U.S. 57 (1909).
47. Id. at 70 (emphasis added). But see Hall, supra note 26, at 569 (criticizing absence of
mental state requirement in petty offenses as effectively penalizing innocent).
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It is important to note that in England, the first of these public wel-
fare cases was premised on the notion that it was more convenient for the
state to bring an action affecting a group of persons in a criminal pro-
ceeding rather than place the burden of proof of direct harm on certain
individuals in a civil suit.48 The inherent proof problems of requiring
mens rea were recognized as an impediment to effective enforcement.
Because the purpose of the action was purportedly not to punish the indi-
vidual-indeed the penalty was light-no mens rea was required though
the form of the suit was criminal. This use of the criminal machinery to
control or prohibit certain acts in order to protect the public evolved
concurrently with the growth of industrialized America. Courts were
cognizant of the inherent proof problems if a knowledge requirement
were inferred in such statutes.49 As the number of automobiles in-
creased, smokestacks proliferated and congestion intensified, the courts
became more comfortable upholding such use of the criminal system to
enforce protective legislation, particularly because the penalties were
light.
Although historically such criminal sanctions did not include
lengthy prison terms or heavy fines, by 1921 such penalties did not cause
the Supreme Court to pause.50 In finding that common-law scienter need
not be read into an indictment under the Narcotic Act of 1914, the Court
in United States v. Balint 5 did not take note of the harshness of the
penalty. Rather, the primary concern of the Court was to avoid imped-
ing congressional purpose in a public welfare statute by imposing proof
requirements:
While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was
a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime,
and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where
the statutory definition did not in terms include it, there has
been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions
48. The Queen v. Stephens, I Q.B. 702, 706 (1866). Judge Mellor essentially espoused the
notion that the proceeding was truly civil, although criminal in form. Id. at 708-10; see Sayre,
supra note 27, at 59 n.16. In Stephens the court relied on Regina v. Woodrow, 153 Eng. Rep.
907 (Ex. 1846), wherein Baron Parke upheld prosecution of a sale of adulterated tobacco,
saying:
It is very true that it may produce mischief because an innocent man may suffer from
his want of care in not examining the tobacco... but the public inconvenience would
be much greater if in every case the officers were obliged to prove knowledge. They
would be very seldom able to do so.
Id. at 916.
49. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922).
50. Id The penalty in this case was severe-a fine of up to two thousand dollars, five
years in jail, or both. Id.
51. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such
a requirement. It is a question of legislative intent to be con-
strued by the court.
5 2
Violators could avoid liability by pleading lack of knowledge and thereby
effectively defeat the objective of the statute to protect the general public
interest. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft acknowledged the in-
herent problems of proving a scienter requirement for such public wel-
fare regulations as well as the possibility of penalizing an innocent actor:
Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an inno-
cent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing an innocent
purchaser to danger from the drug, and concluded that the lat-
ter was the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless consider-
ations as to the opportunity of the seller to find out the fact and
the difficulty of proof of knowledge contributed to this
53conclusion.
Chief Justice Taft described statutes as regulatory in nature, founded
upon the police power, with an emphasis on "the achievement of some
social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of
mala in se." 4
This judicial approach was quite consistent with the rationale of the
early English cases emphasizing the thrust of the statute as protection of
the public, not punishment of the individual. The point of divergence,
however, was that Chief Justice Taft took the deliberate step of linking
congressionally intended social policy directly to the penalty:
[I]t merely uses a criminal penalty.., as a means of taxing and
restraining the traffic. Its manifest purpose is to require every
person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that
which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute, and if
he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to pe-
nalize him.55
The reality of the severity of the penalty and the attached social stigma
were not addressed by the Court. This cavalier approach to the fate of
the innocent actor was bottomed upon an overriding interest in legisla-
tive protective policy. Recognizing the proof problems of prosecutors if
scienter were applied, the Court substituted the traditional intent re-
52. Id. at 252 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 252. In support of that notion, the Court cited a number of cases dealing with
violations of general police regulations. See id.
55. Id at 254 (emphasis added).
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quirement with the "at peril" doctrine. The actor was now subject to an
affirmative duty "to find out the facts '5 6 or be penalized.
In another case, United States v. Behrman, 7 argued and decided on
the same days as Balint, the Court merely declared that absent a statu-
tory requirement of intent or knowledge, an indictment under a drug
regulation need not so charge."8 Justice Holmes, a noted criminologist,
dissented curtly: "It seems to me wrong to construe the statute as creat-
ing a crime in this way without a word of warning."59 The Court ap-
peared determined to champion an innocent public over an innocent
actorA0
Thus, legislators strove to protect the populace from increasingly
common dangerous goods, such as drugs, liquor, motor vehicles and
adulterated milk by adopting regulatory measures with generally light
penal sanctions. This novel use of the criminal regime continued for the
next quarter of a century as a host of regulations were passed. Gone
were the days when the criminal system was geared solely toward protec-
tion of the individual. It now equally embraced the legislative goal of
"social betterment. ' 61
D. The Dotterweich Doctrine
Twenty-two years later, in United States v. Dotterweich,62 the
Supreme Court again recognized "a now familiar type of legislation
whereby penalties serve as an effective means of regulation.1 63  The
Court noted the deference it must give to the legislative purpose of pro-
tecting a helpless public.6r The Court specifically recognized that scien-
ter was not required: "Such legislation dispenses with the conventional
56. Id
57. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
58. Id at 288.
59. Id at 290.
60. Id. at 288.
61. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
62. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
63. Id at 280-81.
64. The Court stated:
The Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was an exertion by Congress of its power to keep
impure and adulterated food and drugs out of the channels of commerce. By the Act
of 1938, Congress extended the range of its control over illicit and noxious articles
and stiffened the penalties for disobedience. The purposes of this legislation thus
touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modem
industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection. Regard for these purposes should
infuse construction of the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of
government and not merely as a collection of English words.
Id, at 280 (emphasis added).
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requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing."65
In Dotterweich, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Joseph H.
Dotterweich, the president and general manager of Buffalo Pharmacal
Company, for the shipment of misbranded drugs under the Federal Food
and Drug Act of 1938.66 The Court upheld the conviction without any
evidence of personal guilt on the defendant's part,67 thereby subjecting
him to criminal misdemeanor penalties.
The Court again returned to the "at peril" doctrine and, in the fact
situation of the modem corporation, significantly expanded the doctrine.
The "at peril" actor, who had the affirmative duty to ascertain facts, in-
cluded not only direct actors, but also those who, by virtue of their posi-
tion in the corporation were deemed responsible. The Court said that the
statute, "[i]n the interest of the larger good, ... puts the burden of acting
at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible
relation to a public danger."6 In Dotterweich, the Court found the of-
fense to be committed by "all who have a responsible share in the fur-
therance of the transaction which the statute outlaws." '69 The Court
found that Congress intended to include as responsible actors those cor-
porate employees "who have the opportunity of informing themselves of
the existence of conditions imposed for protection of consumers before
sharing in illicit commerce."70 This "class of employees ' 71 apparently
included corporate officers or employees who had responsibility for
transactions that are the subject of public welfare statutes. These class
members must arguably inform themselves of existing statutes relevant to
that transaction and the facts pertinent to that transaction.
The Dotterweich doctrine thus placed corporate employees, by vir-
tue of their position in relation to the regulated transaction, "at peril."
Because the Balint Court had already applied the "at peril" doctrine to a
regulatory statute with a substantial criminal penalty, corporate employ-
ees, under Dotterweich, were thus probably liable for similar penalties as
long as responsibility could attach through corporate position.
Invoking the "at peril" doctrine,72 the Court effectively created a
more modem doctrine, designed to uphold legislation it deemed neces-
65. Id at 280-81.
66. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988).
67. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
68. Id at 281.
69. Id at 284.
70. Id at 285.
71. Id
72. See id at 281. The "at hazard" language that Justice Frankfurter used is certainly a
reference to the "at peril" doctrine.
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sary in a complex world. Assuming that Congress had balanced the
rights of the individual against those of the public, the Court appeared to
view its role as that of enforcer of the legislative purpose, regardless of
the impact upon the individual. "Hardship," said the Court, "there
doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction
through consciousness of wrongdoing may be totally lacking.
'73
This principle, that knowledge of wrongdoing need not be shown if
conduct threatens public safety, obviously pries open the door to abuse of
the rights of the individual. Justice Felix Frankfurter warily refused to
delineate the affected class, declaring it "too treacherous to define or even
to indicate by way of illustration."'74 Conversely, the Court called upon
"the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the
ultimate judgment of juries" to determine which individuals would be
held responsible under the statute.75 In a stinging dissent in this five-to-
four decision, Justice Murphy declared "that situation is precisely what
our constitutional system sought to avoid."' 76 Nonetheless, the Dot-
terweich doctrine was destined to lay the foundation for consideration of
modem public welfare legislation."
73. Id at 284. It is also noteworthy that the opinion did not discuss proof problems for
enforcement but instead declared legislative purpose sufficient. Id. at 282-84.
74. Id at 285.
75. Id
76. Id at 292 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy believed the statute was unclear as
to the individual liability of corporate officers. Id (Murphy, J., dissenting). For purposes
herein Justice Murphy's statement is relevant:
To erect standards of responsibility is a difficult legislative task and the opinion of
this court admits that it is "too treacherous" and a "mischievous futility" for us to
engage in such pursuits. But the only alternative is a blind resort to "the good sense
of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of ju-
ries." Yet that situation is precisely what our constitutional system sought to avoid.
Reliance on the legislature to define crimes and criminals distinguishes our form of
jurisprudence from less desirable ones. The legislative power to restrain the liberty
and to imperil the good reputation of citizens must not rest upon the variable atti-
tudes and opinions of those charged with the duties of interpreting and enforcing the
mandates of the law.
Id. at 292-93 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
77. At the time, the Dotterweich case met with mixed reviews. One commentator
declared:
In the public interest of insuring prudence in the conduct of the business of the Buf-
falo Pharmacal Co., a majority of the Justices deemed it wise to place a criminal
stigma on the defendant; a stigma that is predicated wholly upon chance, for it neces-
sarily follows that in the absence of fraud, participation, acquiescense [sic] or even
negligence, the act of adulteration and misbranding was not within Dotterweich's
power of human control.
Note, Vicarious Criminal Responsibility, 19 IND. L.J. 265, 268 (1944); see also Benjamin M.
Quigg, Jr., Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Punishment for Acts Done Without Con-
sciousness of Wrongdoing, 42 MICH. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1944) (arguing that elimination of
knowledge and intent requirements does not violate due process if public welfare justifies elimi-
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E. Mala In Se or Mala Prohibita?
Legal scholars, tracing the history of crimes through Blackstone,
have decried what they perceive to be a blurring of the distinction be-
tween mala in se and mala prohibita .78 Crimes mala in se are character-
ized as differing from crimes mala prohibita in certain important
respects. First, without criminal intent there is no mala in se offense,
whereas for mala prohibita, no criminal intent need be proven unless the
statute so requires.7 9 Second, innocence, mistake of fact and a lack of
negligence are defenses for mala in se crimes but not mala prohibita of-
fenses." Third, the proof requirement differs; for mala in se crimes, evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt is required, while a preponderance of
the evidence will suffice for mala prohibita offenses."1 Fourth, the doc-
trine of vicarious liability applies to mala prohibita but not to mala in se
crimes.82 Finally, in conspiracy cases, commentators have noted that ig-
norance of the law is no defense for a crime mala in se, yet it bars prose-
cution for crimes mala prohibita, provided the action "would be proper
except for the statute."8 3 Other scholars have rejected the mala in se!
mala prohibita paradigm as structurally unsound. 4
In the early 1900s, the issue arose as to whether violations of stat-
utes or agency regulations resulting in stiff penalties were mala in se or
mala prohibita, so that appropriate judicial procedural steps might be
taken. It was apparent that such crimes, unless they contained a statu-
tory mens rea, were mala prohibita. This caused great consternation.
Courts and commentators at the middle of the Twentieth Century re-
nation). But see Note, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Corporations-Criminal Liability
of Officers and Agents, 12 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 366 (1944) (concluding that officers of corpo-
ration are brought within statute only by some act condemned according to settled doctrines of
criminal law).
78. See Sayre, supra note 27, at 70-75, 78-83; Alfred L. Gausewitg, Criminal Law-
Reclassification of Certain Offenses as Civil Instead of Criminal, 12 Wis. L. REv. 365 (1937);
Otto Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARv. L. REv. 615, 636-42 (1942); Rollin M.
Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARv. L. Rv. 905, 906 (1939); Roscoe Pound, The
Law of the Land, 62 AM. L. Rv. 174 (1928); W.T.S. Stallybrass, The Eclipse ofMens Rea, 52
L.Q. Ruv. 60, 64-67 (1936).
79. Rollin M. Perkins, The Civil Offense, 100 U. PA. L. Rlv. 832, 835 (1952).
80. Id at 834-39.
81. Id at 836. Perkins points out that this distinction is a result of the court's recognition
that malaprohibita violators are subject to light penalties: "If the penalty is too extreme to be
appropriate for an offense mala prohibita the proceeding is criminal in substance as well as in
form and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for conviction." Id at 836 n.21 (citing
United States v. The Brig Burdett, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 682 (1835)).
82. Id. at 835-36 & n.18.
83. Id. at 836-37.
84. Id. at 842.
November 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
fused to term such violations as criminal and avidly sought a better de-
scription. One commentator said:
An offense malum prohibitum is not a crime. This was recog-
nized by Blackstone and others .... It is clearly indicated by
the persistent search for an appropriate label, such as "public
torts," "public welfare offenses," "prohibitory laws," "prohib-
ited acts," "regulatory offenses," "police regulations," "admin-
istrative misdemeanors," "quasi-crimes," or "civil offenses.""
The underlying premise of this search was the insistence that regulatory
laws could create crimes only by specific requirement of intent or crimi-
nal negligence.86  Severe penalties were to be limited to statutory
crimes.8
7
Amidst that furor, the Supreme Court addressed a federal agency
regulation that provided for stiff fines and imprisonment for knowing vio-
lations;88 within thirty days it considered a federal statute that likewise
provided for stiff fines and imprisonment and contained "knowing" lan-
guage.8 9 The differing results of these cases reflect the tension between
traditional concepts of crimes and the recognition of the need to protect
society.
In Morissette v. United States," Justice Jackson, writing for a unani-
mous Court, held that a showing of criminal intent was required to prove
the element of "knowing" in a federal statute prohibiting embezzlement,
theft or conversion of government property.91 Following a careful re-
view of the evolution of "public welfare offenses," 92 the Court refused "to
expand the doctrine of crimes without intent to include those charged
here."93 Embezzlement and theft were recognized by the Court as com-
85. Id at 841-42. Although Perkins published this article in 1952, he did not include a
discussion of Dotterweich.
86. Id at 848.
87. Id
88. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
89. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
90. 342 U.S. 246 (1952); see also The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARV. L. REv. 89,
130 (1952) (discussing Morissette); Charles R. Desmond, Comment, Criminal Law-Lar-
ceny-Criminal Intent, 1 BuFF. L. REV. 326 (1952) (same); Donald F. Storm, Comment,
Criminal Law-Scienter as an Element of a Statutory Crime, Fall U. ILL. L.F. 449 (1952)
(same); Note, Criminal Law-Criminal Intent in Statutory Offenses, 25 S. CAL. L. REv. 135
(1952) (same); Comment, Criminal Law-Mens Rea-Requirement in Action for Converting
Government Property-Necessity for Criminal Intent, 5 VAND. L. REv. 828 (1952) (same);
Note, Criminal Law-Mens Rea in Statutory Offenses-Public Welfare Offenses, 26 TUL. L.
REv. 391 (1952) (same).
91. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270-71.
92. Id at 250-63.
93. Id at 260. As Professor Sayre noted:
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mon-law mala in se crimes historically requiring proof of criminal intent.
The Court stated that:
[Where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumu-
lated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.
94
Justice Jackson neatly distinguished United States v. Balint"9 and
United States v. Behrman 96 by noting that the statutes at issue in those
cases did not contain "knowing" language. The Court rejected the
common-law tradition of inferring such language with this declaration:
Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely
adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already
so well defined in common-law and statutory interpretation by
the states may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same
silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose defi-
nition the courts have no guidance except the Act. Because the
offenses before the Court in the Balint and Behrman cases were
of this latter class, we cannot accept them as authority for elim-
inating intent from offenses incorporated from the common
law.
97
Thus, drug cases, new to general law, need not be accorded common-law
requirements of mens rea. The Court related the "abandonment of the
ingredient of intent not merely with considerations of expediency in ob-
taining convictions, nor with the malum prohibitum classification of the
crimes, but with the peculiar nature and quality of the offense."9" But
the Court failed to factually distinguish Dotterweich, choosing rather to
It is fundamentally unsound to convict a defendant for a crime involving a substan-
tial term of imprisonment without giving him an opportunity to prove that his action
was due to an honest and reasonable mistake of fact or that he acted without guilty
intent. If the public danger is widespread or serious the practical situation can be
met by shifting to the shoulders of defendant the burden of proving lack of guilty
intent. But the traditional requisite of a mens rea as a requisite for criminality still
constitutes a necessary and important safeguard for criminal proceedings and except
in case of public welfare offenses involving light penalties should be scrupulously
maintained.
Sayre, supra note 27, at 82-83.
94. Morisette, 342 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added).
95. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
96. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
97. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 262 (emphasis added).
98. IAl at 259 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
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classify it as an example of the application of "legislation whereby penal-
ties serve as an effective means of regulation."99
If Dotterweich were to be termed as a mala prohibita situation, the
doctrines of vicarious liability and no defense of mistake or ignorance
were rightfully applied, provided there was no heavy penalty, which his-
torically demanded proof of criminal intent. It is clear Justice Jackson
was aware of the mala prohibita and mala in se doctrines, for he offered
Dotterweich as a portent of possible harsh results from such regulations,
and left open the definition of crimes that require a mental element. 100
It seems that Justice Jackson was firmly bent on blocking Congress
from usurping ancient common-law rights of citizens for the sake of mere
expediency:
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to
change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The
purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement
of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction,
to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common
law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the
freedom heretofore allowed juries.10 '
A few years later, in Boyce Motor Lines v. United States,10 2 follow-
ing an explosion in the Holland Tunnel that injured sixty people, a truck-
ing company was criminally prosecuted for "knowing" violation of an
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation on transportation of explo-
sives.103 Denying a challenge on vagueness grounds, the Court declared
that "no more than a reasonable degree of certainty"'" is demanded by
the law for a criminal statute "to give notice of the required conduct to
one who would avoid its penalties."10 The Court found a requirement
of culpable intent in the regulation's inclusion of "knowing" and rejected
99. Id. at 259-60.
100. Id at 260.
101. Id at 263.
102. 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
103. Id at 339 n.3; see also The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARV. L. REV. 89, 130
(1952) (discussing Boyce Motor Lines); E.C. Bend, Jr., Comment, Constitutional Law-Vague-
ness in the Definition of a Crime, 7 ARK. L. REV. 135 (1953) (same).
104. Boyce Motor Lines, 342 U.S. at 340.
105. Id The Court noted that the regulation provided:
"Drivers of motor vehicles transporting any explosive, inflammable liquid, inflamma-
ble compressed gas, poisonous gas, shall avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasi-
ble, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares,
places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and danger-
ous crossings."
Id. at 338-39 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 197.1(b) (repealed 1979)).
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a claim that the enforcement of the regulation violated due process."°6
The Court also seemed to suggest that such intent is to be proven by a
showing of willful neglect.107
F. Nature of the Action
In Lambert v. California,'0 8 the Supreme Court struck down a regu-
latory measure that provided for criminal penalties and did not contain a
requirement of scienter. 1' Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in
this five-to-four decision, recognized "wide latitude in the lawmakers to
declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence
from its definition."' 10 However, he declared the requirement that con-
victed felons register within five days of arrival in Los Angeles to be too
severe, as it provided no opportunity "to avoid the consequences of the
law or to defend any prosecution brought under it.""' Justice Douglas
shaped the opinion in terms of due process and fairness." 2 This evoked a
vociferous dissent from Justice Frankfurter. 1
3
Significantly, the Court chose to look at the nature of the action to
determine whether actual knowledge or proof of probability of such
knowledge was required. Although the Court did not differentiate
United States v. Balint 14 and United States v. Dotterweich,"5 per se, as
dealing with dangerous goods or acts, it offered those holdings as support
106. Boyce Motor Lines, 342 U.S. at 342.
107. Id. "It must be shown that the petitioner knew that there was a practicable, safer
route through the tunnel, or that petitioner willfully neglected to exercise its duty under the
Regulation to inquire into the availability of such an alternative route." Id. Justice Jackson,
dissenting, pointed out that delivery of the goods was achievable only through use of bridges,
viaducts or tunnels. Id. at 344. He argued that the agency regulation, which should be held to
"considerable precision .... prescribe[d] no duty in terms of a degree of care that must be
exercised in moving the equipment." Id. at 345 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
108. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
109. Id. at 229-30.
110. Id. at 228.
111. Id. at 229. "Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was
no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due
process." Id. at 229-30.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 230 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, described
the majority position as "an isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents-a dere-
lict on the waters of the law." IaM at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He exclaimed the laws
to be "thick with provisions that command that some things not be done and others be done,
although persons convicted under such provisions may have had no awareness of what the law
required or that what they did was wrongdoing." Id. at 230 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).
114. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
115. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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for the position that passive conduct-failure to register-"is unlike the
commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should
alert the doer to the consequences of his deed."'1 6 This attention to the
intrinsic nature of the action is consistent with previous cases.
Indeed, in the next Supreme Court case to deal with intent or
knowledge in a regulatory statute, United States v. Freed,1 7 the Court
looked at the nature of the action-possession of hand grenades-and
unanimously upheld the Act." 8 The Court noted that Freed is "in the
category neither of Lambert, nor of Morrisette, but is closer to Dot-
terweich." 119 The Act required "no specific intent or knowledge that the
hand grenades were unregistered .... [T]he only knowledge required to
be proven was knowledge that the instrument possessed was a
firearm.
120
In so holding, the Court returned to the "at peril" doctrine of
Balint:
This is a regulatory measure in the interest of public safety,
which may well be premised on the theory that one would
hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is
not an innocent act. They are highly dangerous weapons, no
less dangerous than the narcotic involved in United States v.
Balint .... [The] manifest purpose [of this statute, as with the
statute at issue in Balint] is to require every person.., to ascer-
tain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the
inhibition of the statute ....2'
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF "KNOWLEDGE"
A. Public Welfare and Scienter
Public welfare regulations were a part of the legal fabric by 1970.122
Aimed primarily at regulating dangerous or fundamental goods or their
transfer, such regulations required mens rea only if expressly dictated by
the regulation itself. Common-law mens rea, proof of criminal intent or
116. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added).
117. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
118. Id at 609-10.
119. Id at 609; see supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. Lambert may be placed in a
category of decisions that emphasize the nature of the act. See, eg., Boyce Motor Lines V.
United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) (transporting explosives); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250 (1922) (narcotics).
120. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607.
121. Id. at 609.
122. See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
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criminal negligence, were implied only in those instances in which his-
tory commanded it.
Penalties grew more severe. Legislatures, attempting to avoid strict
liability, incorporated the word "knowingly" into such statutes. 123 The
American judicial system appeared at a potential loggerhead. Public
welfare regulations, growing from the restricted roots of mala prohibita,
now included a scienter requirement. Was that scienter requirement to
be interpreted within the realm of mala in se crimes, requiring criminal
intent and knowledge? Such interpretation would obviously create the
long-recognized enforcement and proof problems. Additionally, such
clogging of the system might ultimately defeat the purpose of the legisla-
tion, to protect the health and safety of the public. The Court found
itself weighing the paramount public health and welfare concerns of the
legislature against a scienter requirement, which, if read in mala in se
terms, would be self-defeating. On the contrary, the Court invoked an
old doctrine-ignorance of the law is no defense-recognized in both
traditional categories, and applied it to "knowing" in a fashion designed
to balance obstructive legal concepts.
B. Ignorance of the Law and International Minerals
A case involving shipments of sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids in
violation of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations presented the
Court with a public health/scienter dilemma.124 In United States v. In-
ternational Minerals Corp.,25 the agency regulation at issue required
shipping papers to detail "any hazardous material" being transported. 126
Violations were punishable by fine or imprisonment. 27 The federal stat-
ute enabling the agency to so regulate provided penalties for a person
who "knowingly violate[d] any such regulation." '128 The House and Sen-
ate, aware of enforcement difficulties under the statute as written, refused
to delete the term "knowingly." 
129
The Supreme Court, cognizant of legislative concern, nonetheless
reached a result that, as Justice Stewart pointed out in the dissent, "effec-
123. See, eg., United States v. International Minerals Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 562-63 (1971).
124. Id. at 558.
125. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
126. 49 C.F.R. § 173.427 (1991).
127. IM.
128. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 835, 62 Stat. 683, 739-40 (repealed 1979).
129. This was done in an attempt to eliminate absolute liability for violations given current
judicial definitions of "knowing." See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 566-68 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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tively delete[d] the word knowingly from the law."13 Heralding the no-
tion that Congress was certainly not "carving out an exception to the
general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,"' 31 the Court held
that a knowing violation of a regulation required knowledge of the regu-
lation. Looking to the nature of the goods, the Court applied the reason-
ing of the "at peril" doctrine:
[W]here, as here and as in Balint and Freed, dangerous or dele-
terious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are
involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone
who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.' 32
Presumption of awareness of a criminal statute was not inconsistent with
the evolution of public welfare regulations, given the inherent dangerous-
ness of the goods.
What was novel was the Court's introduction of the concept that the
term "knowingly violated the regulation" in public welfare statutes did
not require proof of criminal intent or knowledge-elements characteris-
tic of mala in se crimes. Moreover, it should be read against a legal
presumption of knowledge of the existence of a regulation that had previ-
ously been applied to justify the exclusion of the scienter requirement.
This places an insurmountable proof burden on the accused. The Court
so read the term, even though Congress explicitly attempted to eliminate
strict liability by including "knowing" in the definition of the crime. The
objective of the Court was apparent. It aimed to untie the gordian knot
with which Congress wrapped this public welfare legislation. In doing
so, the Court created the beginnings of a new standard of scienter in
criminal public welfare regulation.
Thus, a public welfare statute in which the legislature inserted a
knowledge element was held to require general intent. Public welfare
statutes without a requirement of mens rea traditionally had been upheld
on the basis that the nature of the goods was such that the actor must not
presume regulation and ascertain the facts. The Court now suggested
that this presumption of regulation carried forward in a public welfare
statute, even where the legislature had inserted a mens rea element.
The knowledge requirement of the statute, under International Min-
erals, appeared to attach to the nature of the goods themselves. This is
implicit in the Court's suggestion that mistake of fact would be a legiti-
mate defense. Thus, a statutory requirement of "knowingly" does not
130. Id at 568 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
131. Id at 563.
132. Id. at 565.
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require knowledge of the regulation, but it seems to require knowledge of
the dangerous nature of the goods. 133 A person thinking in good faith
that he or she was shipping distilled water when in fact he or she was
shipping some dangerous acid would not be covered.13 1 Those who deal
in certain goods act with culpable criminal intent when they unknow-
ingly violate a regulatory statute of which they are deemed to be
aware. 135 In cases malaprohibita and those involving public welfare reg-
ulations, mistake of fact is generally not an available defense though it is
a defense to crimes mala in se.
136
Applying the "at peril" presumption of regulation to a statute with a
mens rea element placed the actor in the same position as he or she
would be under a public welfare statute with no mens rea element. The
difference is the suggestion that perhaps good faith or mistake of fact
may be a defense, as in mala in se crimes. However, the reasonable per-
son may be held to a "should have known" standard concerning the na-
ture of the goods, further limiting the knowledge element. 137 Thus, mens
rea seems limited to a defense of mistake of fact. It is not at all clear that,
under International Minerals, "knowing" created a judicial standard of
recognizable mens rea where the nature of the action-such as transfer of
dangerous devices, products or waste materials-was subject to public
welfare regulation. Thus, under International Minerals, the basic propo-
sition of the "at peril" doctrine, that the handlers of dangerous or funda-
mental goods act at peril in relation thereto, was upheld. Additionally, a
statutory requirement of "knowingly" did not require knowledge of the
regulation but might include knowledge of the dangerous nature of the
goods. No standard of care was discussed as relevant in an interpretation
of "knowingly," as "knowingly" was, in reality, not interpreted but effec-
tively deleted. What is clear is that the Court, in the arena of public
welfare statutes, will recognize "leeway for the exercise of congressional
133. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), in which the Court noted: "[Tihe public interest in the
purity of its food is so great as to warrant the imposition of the highest standard of care on
distributors-in fact an absolute standard which will not hear the distributor's plea as to the
amount of care he has used." Id at 152. Rather, "[h]is ignorance of the character of the food
is irrelevant." Id; cf United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (holding that prefer-
ence to protect innocent purchasers of drugs from possible injustices by sellers was implicit in
Narcotic Act of 1914).
134. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563-64.
135. Id (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), for common-law presump-
tion of need to prove intention).
136. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1943).
137. This would be consistent with the "willful neglect" standard applied to the knowledge
requirement in Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952). See supra note 107
and accompanying text.
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discretion in applying the reach of mens rea."' 13 In this instance, such
leeway permits a presumption of knowledge of the regulation itself.
C. The Dotterweich Doctrine: Park Extension
Having recognized the application of the "at peril" doctrine to in-
clude those "in responsible relation to a public danger," '139 the Dot-
terweich Court dispensed with the "conventional requirement for
criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing."'" This doctrine
was subsequently applied in a case against the president of a nationwide
food chain to uphold his conviction for failure to maintain a rodent-free
warehouse in Baltimore. In United States v. Park,'4' a criminal prosecu-
tion was brought under § 301 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act. 42 The first violation of this statute was a misdemeanor; subsequent
violations were felony offenses. 14 3 Relying heavily on Dotterweich, the
Supreme Court held that the jury charge need not include the element of
"wrongful action."'" Instead, the Court found that a "responsible rela-
tion to the situation" of the warehouse was sufficient.' 45 Thus, the con-
viction of Park for violation of the statute with no showing of criminal
intent was upheld solely on the basis of his constructive knowledge of the
warehouse condition by virtue of his position as president.
This "responsible relation" or "responsible share,"'146 which creates
liability for the corporate employee, is, however, based not on mere posi-
tion, but on the "authority" respecting the regulated conditions that the
employee exercises.' 47 The Court described the "measure of culpability"
as a consideration of the authority of the corporate agent in relation to
138. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564.
139. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
140. Id.
141. 421 U.S. 658 (1974).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1988).
143. The first offense was punishable by a fine of not more than $1000 or a maximum of one
year in prison, and a felony offense was subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or a maxi-
mum of three years in prison. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1988). Park was fined $50 for each of five
violations. Park, 421 U.S. at 666.
144. Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
145. Id at 659, 673-76.
146. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85.
147. Park, 421 U.S. at 674. "The rationale of the interpretation given the Act in Dot-
terweich, as holding criminally accountable the persons whose failure to exercise the authority
and supervisory responsibility reposed in them by the business organization resulted in the
violation complained of, has been confirmed in our subsequent cases." Id. at 671.
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the duties imposed by the statute. 148 Such a corporate employee may
raise the defense of "lack of power."'
149
What is troublesome about Park is not the application of the Dot-
terweich Doctrine to the fact situation, but the language that suggests
another "positive duty."'150 Chief Justice Burger declared that under this
particular public welfare statute, corporate employees must undertake af-
firmative steps to prevent violations:
[T]he Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and rem-
edy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty
to implement measures that will insure that violations will not
occur. The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on
responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding,
and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the
public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume
positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and
products affect the health and well-being of the public that sup-
ports them. 51
The extension of the Dotterweich Doctrine by Park to include a
"positive duty" to prevent violations changes considerably the scope of
the "at peril" theory upon which it was based. Originating as a legal
presumption of knowledge of regulation to be applied when the legisla-
tive intent was to require no scienter, the "at peril" doctrine appears to
carry additional affirmative duties imposed by the judiciary. Failure to
perform these duties may result in proof, or an inference, of guilt. This is
particularly worrisome in cases in which the statute itself contains no
knowledge requirement or standard of care.
It thus appears that those engaged in certain industries, ranging
from the manufacture of food and milk to transporting dangerous mater-
ials, act "at peril" by virtue of the nature of the goods in which they deal.
This demands learning the facts relating to regulation of the transaction.
Additionally, there may be an affirmative duty to prevent violations of
applicable regulations by exercising a standard of care not contained in
the statute but prescribed by Park. Yet, this standard was not deline-
148. Id at 674.
149. Id. at 677. The Court stated:
If such a claim is made, the defendant has the burden of coming forward with evi-
dence, but this does not alter the Government's ultimate burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant's guilt, including his power, in light of the duty im-
posed by the Act, to prevent or correct the prohibited condition.
Id at 673.
150. Id. at 672.
151. Id (emphasis added).
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ated. Such were the parameters of knowledge and its substitute, the "at
peril" doctrine, in public welfare offenses.
III. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
AS PUBLIC WELFARE LEGISLATION
A. Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecution Under the Refuse
Act of 1899
The first congressional legislation aimed specifically at water pollu-
tion was passed in 1948.152 The statute contained no criminal penalty
provisions. Written in terms of public nuisance, the government's re-
course under the statute was to bring an action to abate the nuisance.
15 3
Given that cumbersome mechanism, 15 4 government regulators turned to
section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, commonly called the Refuse
Act of 1899.155 That Act made unlawful throwing, discharging or depos-
iting refuse matter in navigable waters of the United States; 5 6 such ac-
tions were punishable by criminal penalties of not more than one year of
imprisonment or a fine of no more than $2500.157
In early Refuse Act cases brought against corporate defendants, sci-
enter was not required by the courts. 15 Violation of the statute was per-
ceived as simply malum prohibitum, 59 requiring no scienter absent
152. Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)). For a history of that Act, see Frank J. Barry,
The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A
Study of the Difflculty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1103 (1970).
153. 33 U.S.C. § 466a(d)(1) (1948) (omitted as superseded by Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972)). For a discussion of the inefficiency of this remedy and the history leading to the
1972 Amendment, see Richard M. Carter, Note, Federal Enforcement of Individual and Cor-
porate Criminal Liability for Water Pollution, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. Rnv. 576, 579-85 (1980).
154. For a discussion of the inadequacy of abatement devices in water pollution cases, see
William C. Steffin, Note, The Refuse Act of 1899: New Tasks for an Old Law, 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 782, 782-84 (1971).
155. Rivers and Harbors Act, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (1899) (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988)).
156. Id. § 13, 30 Stat. at 1152.
157. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). For a thorough review of the provisions of the Act from a
prosecutor's point of view, see James T.B. Tripp & Richard M. Hall, Federal Enforcement
Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALB. L. REv. 60 (1970).
158. See, eg., United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. 111. 1969).
159. Id. at 915. "Depositing refuse in navigable waters is the malum prohibitum constitut-
ing a violation of section 13." Id. (footnote omitted). The court noted that even indirect
discharges have been held to violate the Act. Id It is also significant that the court, in finding
no scienter requirement, specifically delineated this violation as malum prohibitum as opposed
to mala in se. Id at 915 n.3. "[I]n the absence of any statutory or decisional requirement of a
showing of scienter in a prosecution brought under a seventy-year old statute, this court finds
no basis for reading such a requirement into the Act at this late date." Id.
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specific statutory requirement or judicial precedent."6 Individual de-
fendants, facing a possible jail sentence, were held to a different Refuse
Act standard. A federal district court held that the prosecution must
prove the defendant not only had knowledge of the violation, but had the
ability to take steps to remedy the situation. 161
In 1974 the First Circuit Court of Appeals, noting that courts had
historically not required proof of scienter, held a corporate defendant
liable under the Act in United States v. White Fuel Corp. 16 2 The court
proceeded to link offenses under the Act with public welfare offenses.'63
A due care defense was rejected on the grounds that in the case of corpo-
rate defendants, application of such a defense would cripple the Act as an
enforcement tool, because it would place the government in a difficult
proof position. 1' It is important to note, however, that this court specifi-
cally recognized that such a harsh approach was appropriate for a corpo-
rate defendant that cannot be imprisoned and faces moderate fines. 165
The court declined to "consider to what extent absolute liability would
carry over to cases where incarceration [was] a real possibility."' 66 This
left the requirement of scienter for an individual defendant an open ques-
tion under the Refuse Act.
The significance of this case in early environmental criminal prose-
cutions lies in the court's two-pronged approach to statutory application.
The White Fuel court, determined to keep refuse out of the water, inter-
preted the Refuse Act as malum prohibitum. It refused to accept "gener-
alized due care defenses"' 67 based on "industry-wide or commonly
accepted standards."' 68 Liability was to be predicated "on actual non-
compliance rather than either intentions or best efforts."' 69 The court
was comfortable in so holding because the penalty for the corporate de-
fendant was a moderate fine.'70 To shore up that approach, the court
160. Two unreported cases are cited by federal prosecutors as further support for that hold-
ing. See Tripp & Hall, supra note 157, at 75 n.56.
161. See Tripp & Hall, supra note 157, at 76. The authors advocate elimination of any
scienter requirement on deterrence grounds when corporate officers are individual defendants.
Id.
162. 498 F.2d 619, 622 (lst Cir. 1974) ("In the seventy-five years since enactment, no court
to our knowledge has held that there must be proof of scienter; to the contrary, the Refuse Act
has commonly been termed a strict liability statute.").
163. Id. (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1952)).
164. Id. at 623.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 623-24.
167. Iai at 623.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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connected this malum prohibitum Refuse Act provision with public wel-
fare offenses, citing Morissette dicta on the legislative policy of not re-
quiring intent in public welfare offenses. 71  But what the court had in
fact done is examine the requirement of scienter based upon the nature of
the defendant. Because the defendant was a corporation which could not
go to jail and could easily pay a fine, malum prohibitum principles were
deemed appropriate. This same statute, however, applied to an individ-
ual who would face a jail term, made the court pause. The statute was
thus malum prohibitum for a corporation but perhaps not for an individ-
ual. 172 The distortion of the traditional criminal framework thus begins
with the earliest circuit court cases considering environmental violations
as crimes.
It is important to recall that malum prohibitum grew out of the need
to protect society. Enforced by light penalties, the "at peril" doctrine
was consistently applied through the years to handlers of dangerous
goods or goods fundamental to society. Such goods, by their nature, ini-
tially placed handlers, and later those in responsible relation, 173 on notice
of possible ramifications for their actions. The Supreme Court consist-
ently looked to the nature of the goods-drugs, food, firearms, food
stamps-to determine whether scienter was required.174 The court, in
determining applicability of the statute, then reviewed the individual's
role in relation to the goods, often with a harsh result,1 75 but always with
a view that the burden of safeguarding the public must be placed affirma-
tively on responsible parties.
In White Fuel, the corporate owner of a tank farm was prosecuted
for oil seepage into Boston Harbor from a massive underground accumu-
lation that had formed for over twenty years as a result of common in-
dustry practices. 176 This case illustrates the quandary of the court in
applying traditional doctrines to novel environmental violations. In the
early 1970s, criminal prosecution for violations of federal laws not
drafted primarily as criminal statutes for that purpose placed the courts
171. Id. at 622.
172. The court quoted Morissette: "'The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually
is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no
more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities."' Id.
(quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952)). Arguably, in the case of a
corporate officer, courts could use this language as a test. They clearly have been reluctant to
do so, however, where incarceration was a penalty.
173. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
175. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-76 (1974).
176. White Fuel, 498 F.2d at 621.
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in a difficult position.177 The nature of the conduct charged-permitting
seepage into the harbor as a result of a business practice that was in fact
being remedied by the corporate owner 17s--was not of the type that tra-
ditionally placed the actor at peril. The defendant, a corporation, was
thus not on notice that it was acting at peril and, in fact, claimed it acted
without negligence. 179 Yet there was seepage, a violation of the Act
caused by a corporate defendant.
For public welfare purposes, the court relied on a malum prohib-
itum rationale. The court rejected White Fuel's arguments that prosecu-
tors were required to prove criminal intent or at least a lack of due care
on the part of the defendant.'8 0 The court recited the "benefit to society
of having an easily defined, enforceable standard which inspires perform-
ance rather than excuses."' 8'
The Refuse Act of 1899, lacking a specific scienter requirement,
stimulated the invocation of the public welfare offense doctrine for envi-
ronmental violations. The introduction by Congress in the 1970s of sci-
enter in environmental statutes, coupled with heavier criminal penalties,
created legal disarray as courts struggled to determine the applicable
scope of scienter within the context of public welfare legislation.
B. Criminal Sanctions Under Early Environmental Statutes
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972182 (FWPCA) con-
tained the first criminal sanctions for negligent and willful violations.'83
"Knowing" false reporting was also subject to criminal penalties. 184 In
1977, in United States v. Hamel, 8 5 the first criminal conviction for will-
ful violation of the Act was upheld against an individual defendant. 186 In
that case, Mr. Hamel was held liable for discharge of gasoline under a
provision of the Act preventing "discharge of any pollutant."' 87 The
Court held that although gasoline was not a listed pollutant under the
Act, the legislature intended to include any material covered by the Re-
177. See, eg., Rivers and Harbors Act § 13.
178. White Fuel, 498 F.2d at 621.
179. Id
180. Id at 623. This argument calls for application of a mala in se standard.
181. Id
182. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
183. Id § 1319(c)(1).
184. Id § 1319(c)(2).
185. 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977).
186. Id For a review of the history of the criminal sanctions provisions of the statute, see
Carter, supra note 153, at 585.
187. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
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fuse Act."'8 In the context of a criminal statute that required a showing
of negligent or willful violation, it is significant that the court refused "to
eschew our construction of the Act out of deference to the general rule
that penal statutes are strictly and narrowly construed." '189 The court
instead chose to adopt "the rule of Standard Oil... and our own cir-
cuit's interpretation of water pollution legislation that it be given a gener-
ous rather than a niggardly construction." 1" Notably, however, the
Refuse Act cases, contrary to Hamel, were brought against corpora-
tions.19 ' On the issue of scienter, the Hamel court merely noted that
with the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA, Congress provided a "har-
sher penalty... with the added burden on the government to prove
scienter."
192
The proof of scienter in a criminal FWPCA violation against an
individual defendant was later delineated as not requiring the govern-
ment to prove specific criminal intent by a federal district court.19 3 The
court based that determination on the nature of the Act, namely that the
violation of the false reporting provisions of section 1319(c)(2) was a
public welfare offense as opposed to a common-law offense. 194 Although
the Clean Water Act cases provided the foundation for many legal prin-
ciples in environmental law, 195 the issue of scienter has arisen principally
188. Hamel, 551 F.2d at 110. The court stated:
It is, of course, true that in hindsight the entire controversy might have been solved
by the single addition of the term "petroleum products" to the definition section. We
do not, however, read the failure to do so as an intent to exclude these materials from
the Act. On the contrary, we conceive the employment of the broad generic terms as
an expression of Congressional intent to encompass at a minimum what was covered
under the Refuse Act of 1899.
The Refuse Act of 1899 is itself a codification of prior legislation. It prohibits
the discharge of "any refuse matter ... other than that flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom, in a liquid state, into any navigable water .. .
Id (citation omitted).
189. Id at 112.
190. Id In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966), aviation gasoline was
held to be refuse under the Refuse Act of 1899. Id. at 226.
191. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
192. Hamel, 551 F.2d at 113 n.9. The court held that the scienter requirement was met by
circumstantial evidence submitted at trial, which showed "Hamel intentionally activated the
necessary levers to discharge the gasoline." Id at 109.
193. United States v. Ouelette, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350, 1351 (E.D. Ark. 1977).
194. Id
195. Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental
Criminal Prosecutions and the Work That Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 900, 906 (1991);
see also United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 955 (6th Cir.) (upholding criminal conviction
for discharge of pollutants), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); United States v. Frezzo Bros.
Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that government need not exhaust civil
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in prosecutions under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA).
196
C. Knowledge Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
1. Felony offenses
Passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act' 97 created
criminal environmental offenses punishable as felonies with fines of up to
$50,000 per day for each violation and imprisonment of two to five
years. 198 These offenses were defined in terms of acting "knowingly."'
19 9
Additionally, "knowing endangerment" was added as a more serious of-
fense, punishable by a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment
for not more than fifteen years, or both.2' A corporate defendant was
subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000.o1 "Knowing endanger-
ment" means the defendant "knows at the time that he thereby places
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. '"202
Such knowledge is to be found in the course of "knowingly" transport-
ing, treating, storing, disposing of or exporting any hazardous waste.20 3
"Person" under the statute has been defined to include owners, op-
erators and employees of a facility.2 4 In United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc.,205 the Third Circuit considered the issue of whether em-
ployees who were not in the position to secure a permit should be subject
to criminal penalties by handling waste. 20 6 After a Dotterweich review of
legislative intent, the Johnson court described RCRA as a public welfare
statute.21 7 As such, the legislative purpose of the Act was reviewed, with
the court concluding that RCRA, like the Food and Drug Act, was an
attempt to control modem hazards and protect the public, and thus per-
sanctions before pursuing criminal sanctions), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); United States
v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (D. Ariz. 1975) (same).
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6989 (1988).
197. IaM
198. Id § 6928(d).
199. Id
200. d § 6928(e).
201. d
202. Id.
203. Id
204. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). The statute defines "person" as "an individual, trust, joint stock
company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(15) (1988).
205. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
206. Id at 665.
207. Id. at 668.
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mitted an interpretation that would not limit the act: 08 "It would un-
dercut the purpose of the legislation to limit the class of potential
defendants to owners and operators where others also bear responsibility
for handling regulated materials."" ° It is clear, however, that although
the court recognized the overriding public purpose to be served by a
broad interpretation of "person" under the statute, it was also concerned
with possible overreaching. Accordingly, the court tackled the task of
defining the scope of the term "knowingly" as applied to employee-
defendants, and merely limited statutory applicability.
The court declared that "knowingly" must include "knowledge that
the waste material was hazardous."21 0 However, it did not define "haz-
ardous." Next the court determined that each defendant must be found
to know that the company was required to have a permit and that each
knew the company did not have a permit.2 1 Apparently mindful of the
proof problems inherent in that approach, the court noted that "our con-
clusion that 'knowingly' applies to all elements of the offense in section
6928(d)(2)(A) does not impose on the government as difficult a burden as
it fears." '12 Indeed, the court found that such knowledge may be in-
ferred from job descriptions and that the jury may be so instructed. 213
This has the effect of shielding the innocent employee who, although he
or she handles waste and is thereby traditionally placed at peril, may not
be in a position to know about or obtain a permit.
The Johnson court accepted RCRA as a public welfare statute as
well as the threshold principle of public welfare legislation, that the
"statutes... are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose. 214
It is significant, however, that the court did not embrace the Interna-
tional Minerals notion that knowledge in a public welfare statute means
knowledge of the goods, and that a presumption of knowledge of the
regulation was to be applied. In an apparent effort to effectuate the pur-
poses of the legislation and simultaneously protect the innocent, the
208. Id.
209. Id. at 667. The court reviewed the statutory language of RCRA and rejected the dis-
trict court's narrow view of the substantive criminal provision. Id. In taking that approach,
the court relied heavily upon United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
210. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 (citing United States v. International Minerals
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1970)).
211. Id. at 669.
212. Id It is noteworthy, however, that the court classified RCRA as a public welfare
statute, which "would be a reasonable basis for reading the statute without any mens rea re-
quirement" if it so chose. Id at 668.
213. Id
214. Id at 666.
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court required proof of knowledge of the statutory elements. Yet this
proof may be inferred from job responsibility.
215
This judicially permitted inference of knowledge actually stems not
from the statute or legislative history,216 but rather from the "responsible
relation" concept of Dotterweich and Park. Although guilty knowledge
in criminal prosecutions may be proven with circumstantial evidence, the
court's determination that such knowledge may be inferred by the jury
"as to those individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with
the corporate defendant ' 217 introduces elements of the expanded "at
peril" doctrine to criminal environmental statutes.
In United States v. Hayes International Corp. ,218 a subsequent
RCRA case, the court was again concerned with balancing the difficult
proof problems inherent in "knowing" violations of a public welfare stat-
ute21 9 with the regulatory purpose sought to be served. The Hayes court
declared that requiring the government to prove that the individual de-
fendant employee knew the disposal site had no permit did not create "an
unacceptable burden of proof" for the government.22 I The court, as in
Johnson, found that such knowledge could be inferred from the actions
of the defendant. 22 1 The inference, however, contrary to Johnson, arose
not from job responsibility, but from the nature of the action.
For transporters of waste, knowledge of permit requirements is an
affirmative duty.222 The Hayes court declared that "in this regulatory
context a defendant acts knowingly if he willfully fails to determine the
permit status of the facility.' '223 This duty to learn the facts and assume,
based on the nature of the activity, that the activity is regulated is consis-
tent with the "at peril" doctrine and the International Minerals ap-
proach. The Hayes court added the concept that inferences of guilty
knowledge may be drawn "from all of the circumstances, including the
215. d at 669.
216. Congress did not seek "to define 'knowing' for offenses under subsection (d); that pro-
cess has been left to the courts under general principles." S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5038.
217. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670.
218. 786 F.2d 1499 (1lth Cir. 1986).
219. The court held that "section 6928(d)(1) is undeniably a public welfare statute, involv-
ing a heavily regulated area with great ramifications for the public health and safety." Id at
1503.
220. Id. at 1504.
221. Id. at 1504-05.
222. The court noted: "As the Supreme Court has explained it is completely fair and rea-
sonable to charge those who choose to operate in such areas with knowledge of the regulatory
provisions." Id. at 1503.
223. Id. at 1504 (emphasis added).
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existence of the regulatory scheme."224 Thus, the Hayes court and the
Johnson court used inferences, drawn from differing elements of the "at
peril" doctrine, to facilitate a finding of knowledge in RCRA criminal
prosecutions.22 On the issue of hazardous waste, the court held that the
jury must find that the defendant knew "what the waste was."22 6 How-
ever, knowledge that the waste was a regulated substance was not
required.
227
This requirement to know "what the waste was" was upheld as part
of a jury instruction in United States v. Sellers.228 The court further ob-
served that the omission of proof that the disposed-of substance was "po-
tentially hazardous or dangerous to persons or the environment" was not
plain error.229 The court reasoned that "paint and paint solvent waste,
by its very nature is potentially dangerous to the environment and to
persons. '23 ' Therefore, the court concluded that "there can be no doubt
that Sellers knew ... that regulations ... would exist governing the
manner of [the waste's] disposal.' 231  The Fifth Circuit took notice in a
footnote that "RCRA is a regulatory statute intended to protect public
health and as such, it should be construed to effectuate its regulatory
purpose. ' 23 2 Thus, the court did not require specific proof that defend-
ants knew the substance was hazardous. It could be inferred from
knowledge of the nature of the goods.
233
224. Id. at 1505. The court suggested that inferences may be drawn when there is no evi-
dence of an assertion of proper licensing, or the circumstances of the transaction-for example,
an unusual price--justify the inference. Id. at 1504.
225. The Johnson court relied on the responsible position of the defendant while the Hayes
court, following the approach used in United States v. International Minerals Corp., 402 U.S.
558 (1971), applied the traditional presumption of regulation to a public welfare statute with a
knowledge element.
226. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504.
227. Id. at 1501 n.1. The court declared that those operating in such areas are charged with
knowledge of the regulatory provisions. Id at 1503. It would, thus, be "no defense to claim
no knowledge that the paint waste was a hazardous waste within the meaning of the regula-
tions." Id; see also Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect Criminal Sanctions for Environ-
mental Crimes, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 821, 828-29 (1990) (stating that courts generally have held
that lack of knowledge that waste in question was hazardous is no defense) (citing United
States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)).
228. 926 F.2d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1991).
229. Id at 417.
230. Id
231. Id The court noted: "Thus, when a person knowingly possesses an instrumentality
which by its nature is potentially dangerous, he is imputed with the knowledge that it may be
regulated by public health legislation." Id at 416.
232. Id at 416 n.2.
233. In United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307
(1991), the court held that "the knowledge element of § 6928(d) does extend to knowledge of
the general hazardous character of the wastes." Id at 745. See United States v. Johnson &
[Vol. 26:105
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL STATUTES
In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,234 the
First Circuit squarely rejected a jury instruction allowing an individual
to be found guilty on the basis of his or her status as a responsible corpo-
rate officer.235 Citing Dotterweich and Park as the "seminal cases regard-
ing the responsible corporate officer doctrine," the court recognized that
"corporate officer liability... requires only a finding that the officer had
'authority with respect to the conditions that formed the basis of the al-
leged violations.' "236 The court, however, noting the felony provision of
the statute, declared "we know of no precedent for failing to give effect to
a knowledge requirement that Congress has expressly included in a crim-
inal statute.
2 37
However, the court stated that such knowledge could be inferred
from "relevant circumstantial evidence including [the defendant's] re-
sponsibilities and activities as a corporate executive," and further noted
that the court "could, had it wished, have elaborated on the extent to
which [the defendant's] responsibilities and duties might lead to a reason-
able inference that he knew.' '2 38 The court was concerned with convic-
tion of a federal crime based on "conclusive or 'mandatory' presumptions
of knowledge of the facts constituting the offense. ' 239 The court firmly
recognized: "In a crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere
showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an
adequate substitute for direct circumstantial proof of knowledge." 24
The court prohibited use of a presumption of guilt as a substitute for
knowledge in a public welfare statute containing a scienter requirement.
However, in so doing, it firmly recognized the Dotterweich/Park doctrine
of "responsible relation" to the prohibited act, and lent further strength
to this inferential applicability to criminal environmental statutes.
In United States v. Hoflin,241 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
was asked to reverse the conviction of an individual defendant, the Direc-
tor of Public Works, for RCRA violations on the grounds that the jury
had not been instructed that knowledge of a lack of permit was an essen-
Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). In United
States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447 (1 1th Cir. 1988), the court upheld jury instructions that defend-
ant had to know the waste had potential to harm others in the environment. Id. at 1450.
234. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
235. Id at 51.
236. Id (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 277 (1943)).
237. Id at 52.
238. Id
239. Id. at 53.
240. Id at 55.
241. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
November 19921
138 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tial element of the crime.24 2 The court declined to follow Johnson and
declared that "knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element of
the offense."'243 The court based its interpretation on the language of the
statute and noted that it was consistent with the purpose of RCRA.2 4
Thus, under the Hoflin interpretation, an employee need only "know-
ingly treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous waste." 245 The Ninth Cir-
cuit effectively lifted the shield placed before the lower level employee by
the Third Circuit in Johnson. The "at peril" doctrine, in effect, applies to
all handlers of hazardous waste. The knowledge of "hazardous waste"
required was reduced by the Ninth Circuit to encompass substances that
"had the potential to be harmful to others or to the environment. '246
The public welfare doctrine of placing handlers of certain goods at peril
by the nature of the goods they handle was thus clearly invoked despite
the congressional mandate of proof of knowledge in cases in which felony
penalties result.
Although the circuit court decisions remain at odds regarding
knowledge of the permit as a necessary element of the RCRA crime, the
general tendency of the courts is discernible. In consistently attempting
to effectuate the purpose of the RCRA statute to protect an endangered
public from modem hazards, the courts seek a way to interpret "know-
ingly" broadly, despite increased criminal penalties. Courts, such as
those that decided Hayes and Johnson, do so by use of inference; the
Hoflin court did so by removing the requirement for knowledge of regu-
lation. The traditional "at peril" doctrine, thus, continues to be applied
despite the apparent congressional requirement of intent.
Such a judicial direction is, however, more consistent with purposes
advanced for mala in se crimes: the punishment of individuals, recogniz-
ing the deterrent effect.247 The "betterment of society" as an accepted
criminological goal of public welfare penalties, described by Chief Justice
Taft in United States v. Balint,24 does not seem to be the underlying
theory of criminal environmental statutes. The theory appears to be de-
terrence. Thus, the judicial system finds itself in the difficult position of
applying the public welfare doctrine to a criminal statutory framework
that it was never designed to fit in such a wholesale fashion. The result is
242. Id at 1037.
243. Id at 1039.
244. Id. at 1038.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
246. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039. This charge regarding the nature of the waste was also
upheld in United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1452 (11th Cir. 1988).
247. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
248. 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922); see supra text accompanying note 54.
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contrivance; broad findings of "knowledge" based on inference lead to
felony convictions. Contrivance in Hoflin reached even greater propor-
tions as knowledge of the regulatory scheme was removed as a necessary
element. This leaves only the action of the defendant as an element of
the crime, effectively creating strict liability regardless of the "knowing"
term in the statute.
2. Knowing endangerment
The first criminal conviction under the "knowing endangerment"
provision of RCRA was upheld against a corporate defendant in United
States v. Protex Industries. 9 Congress included "Special Rules" in
RCRA for interpretation of the knowing endangerment provisions.250
The Protex court ruled that use of the term "reasonably expected to
cause death or serious bodily injury" in the jury charge met the require-
ments of the statute.21 The court declared: "The gist of the 'knowing
endangerment' provision of the RCRA is that a party will be criminally
liable if, in violating other provisions of the RCRA, it places others in
danger of great harm and it has knowledge of that danger. ' 252 The court
also noted that the statute was not void for vagueness as the "essence of
the doctrine is that a potential defendant must have some notice or 'fair
warning' that the conduct contemplated is forbidden by the criminal
law."'25 3 The Protex court placed the company on probation, requiring
249. 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(0 (1988). The statute provides:
(f) Special Rules
For the purposes of subsection (e) of this section-
(1) A person's state of mind is knowing with respect to-
(A) his conduct, if he is aware of the nature of his conduct;
(B) an existing circumstance, if he is aware or believes that the circumstance
exists; or
(C) a result of his conduct, if he is aware or believes that his conduct is sub-
stantially certain to cause danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(2) In determining whether a defendant who is a natural person knew that his
conduct placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury-
(A) the person is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief that
he possessed; and
(B) knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant but not by the
defendant himself may not be attributed to the defendant;
Provided, That in proving the defendant's possession of actual knowledge, cir-
cumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took
affirmative steps to shield himself from relevant information.
Id.
251. Protex, 874 F.2d at 744.
252. Id
253. Id at 743 (citation omitted).
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establishment of a $950,000 trust fund for endangered employees, pay-
ment of $440,000 in fines, and a $2,100,000 clean-up of the site.2" 4
The standard of scienter to be applied to a corporate defendant
under the Special Rules appears to be a somewhat less rigorous standard
than that required of the "natural" person. While actual knowledge is
required of the natural person,2"' such knowledge is specifically not to be
attributed to a natural defendant if possessed by another.25 6 Circum-
stantial evidence, however, may be used to prove actual knowledge on
the part of a natural person.257 It is difficult to reconcile the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence-job duties and the existence of a regulation-to
support inferences of knowledge with this statutory restriction on the
attribution of knowledge to a natural person. The restriction against at-
tribution of knowledge is not written into the statute with respect to the
corporate-defendant's state of mind.25 ' It is, however, arguable that such
inference, consistent with other court interpretation of RCRA knowl-
edge, may be drawn.
Additionally, it must be pointed out that the Special Rules provide
use of "circumstantial evidence" to prove actual knowledge.25 9 As cir-
cumstantial evidence generally creates inference, it may well be that a
court, in the case of a natural person as well as a corporate defendant,
will allow the jury to draw inferences from the nature of the actions of
the handlers of waste consistent with the "at peril" doctrine such that
juries will be given more latitude in instructions than is generally allowed
in criminal endangerment suits. The Protex holding, with its rather gen-
eralized approach to the "gist" of RCRA,11 lends little support to an
argument that in an endangerment prosecution the court will lean to-
ward strict requirements of proof of knowledge of all elements of the
statute. Indeed, the Protex court seems to underscore the notion of pub-
lic welfare statutes as primarily designed to protect the public, and not to
"place others in danger of great harm. 261
254. Fromm, supra note 227, at 831-32 (citing United States v. Protex Indus., 18 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2353 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 1988), aff'd, 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989)).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 6298(0(2) (1988).
256. Id.
257. Id
258. The basis of corporate liability is inference of knowledge based upon employee action,
consistent with well-settled corporate liability theory.
259. See supra note 250.
260. Protex, 874 F.2d at 744.
261. Id.
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D. "Knowingly" Under the Endangered Species Act
In 1978 Congress amended the Endangered Species Act262 (ESA) by
substituting "knowingly" for "willfully" in prohibiting violation of the
Act.263 The legislative history reveals that Congress intended to make
"criminal violations of the act a general rather than a specific intent
crime, and subject[ ] importers and exporters of fish and wildlife and
plants to strict liability penalties." 26  Moreover, the committee stated
that it did "not intend to make knowledge of the law an element of...
criminal violations of the Act. ' 265 Knowledge under this environmental
regulatory statute thus requires only a general showing of intent to per-
form the act-such as shoot a panther 66 -rather than the specific act-
to shoot a listed Florida panther. The penalty imposed is a fine of not
more than $25,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both.267 The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Nguyen, 268 noted that the
penalty is a misdemeanor and upheld Congress's right to dispense with a
mens rea requirement.269 The Nguyen court looked to the legislative his-
tory of the Act to uphold a criminal conviction without proof of specific
knowledge.27
The judicial interpretation of scienter as requiring no specific knowl-
edge of the regulatory scheme is consistent with the Hoflin RCRA deci-
sion. Given the more severe penalties applicable in RCRA violations, a
general intent proof requirement is more surprising in that context than
in the ESA context.
262. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544 (1988)).
263. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (1988).
264. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
9453, 9476.
265. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
9484, 9493.
266. See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492-93 (S.D. Fla. 1987); see also
United States v. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988) (government is required to
prove accused knowingly shot animal, not that animal was grizzly bear).
267. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1).
268. 916 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990).
269. Id. at 1019-20.
270. Id. at 1018-19.
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E. The Debate Over Scienter in Migratory Bird Treaty Act
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act271 (MBTA), prior to its amendment
in 1986,272 did not contain a requirement of scienter.273 The absence of a
scienter' requirement led to opposite holdings by courts considering
whether prosecutions under the MBTA violated due process.
In United States v. Wulff,274 the Sixth Circuit dismissed an indict-
ment charging the defendant with selling a necklace made of red-tailed
hawk and great-horned owl talons, holding that, absent a requirement of
scienter, the criminal provisions of the MBTA violated the defendant's
due process rights.275 Relying partly on Judge, now Justice, Blackmun's
opinion in Holdridge v. United States,2 76 the Wulff court concluded that
"the elimination of criminal intent does not violate the due process clause
where (1) the penalty is relatively small, and (2) where conviction does
not gravely besmirch [the defendant's reputation]. 277 The court con-
cluded that the MBTA failed both parts of the test.278 Because "the
crime is not one known to the common law, '2 79 the court refused to
consider that the penalty provisions of the MBTA might contain an im-
plied element of mens rea.
Requested to read scienter into the statute, the court declined on the
grounds that "[a]n element of scienter can be read into an otherwise si-
lent statute only where the crime is one borrowed from the common
law."'280 This court has, thus, re-examined the underpinnings of the ap-
plicability of public welfare regulation, and recalling that it was bot-
tomed on light penalties, refused to apply the at peril doctrine.
Citing its "obligation to afford congressional enactments the benefit
of all reasonable arguments in favor of constitutionality," the Third Cir-
cuit in United States v. Engler281 refused to accept the "government's
concession that the absence of a scienter requirement in the felony provi-
271. Act of July 3, 1918, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
272. Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, § 501, 100 Stat.
3582, 3590 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988)).
273. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712. The MBTA provided for felony penalties of imprisonment
for not more than two years, or a fine of not more than $2000, or both, for the sale, barter or
offer to sell or barter a migratory bird protected by the statute. Id at § 707(b)(2).
274. 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985).
275. Id at 1125.
276. 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960).
277. Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125.
278. Id
279. Id at 1124.
280. Id
281. 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986).
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sion of the [MBTA] violates the due process clause." '282 The court held
that the MBTA penalty provisions did not violate due process because
"due process is not violated by the imposition of strict liability as part of
a regulatory measure in the interest of public safety." '283 Judge Higgin-
botham, in his concurrence, not only disagreed with the majority's ddter-
uination that a violation of the MBTA is a public welfare offense "which
the ordinary citizen would recognize as wrong," but suggested, that be-
cause the evidence showed that the defendant did indeed possess scienter,
the constitutionality of the M3TA need not be passed on.284
In Engler, exactly what a public welfare offense encompasses be-
came an issue. Judge Higginbotham, in his concurring opinion, looked
to the nature of the action prohibited by section 707(b)(2) and declared
that it was not a "public welfare offense"28 5 because it was not "the 'type
of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent
public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's health or
safety.' ,286
Judge Higginbotham also differed with the majority in his discussion
of the qualitative severity of a two-year felony penalty.28 7 The majority
upheld the statute as a permissible congressional "regulatory measure
designed to protect the public welfare."2 ' As to scienter, the majority
found that a public welfare statute need "not specify intent as a necessary
element."28 9 By contrast, Judge Higginbotham examined the legislative
history of the Act and, noting the desire of Congress "to deter com-
mercial exploitation of migratory birds," inferfed scienter as a
requirement.290
This range of approaches to the public welfare doctrine in the con-
text of an environmental criminal statute that is not clearly designed to
protect public health and welfare in the traditional sense-the regulation
of milk, drugs and food-nonetheless demonstrates the inherent difficul-
ties. Does the court look to the purpose of the legislation generally, the
health and safety of the people? Or should the specific purpose of the
environmental statute in question be examined, such as migratory bird
282. Id at 433.
283. Id at 435.
284. Id at 438 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
285. Id at 439 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
286. Id at 439 n.4 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
287. See id. at 439.
288. Id at 432.
289. Id at 431 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)).
290. Id at 438 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (citing S. RlP. No. 1779, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3459, 3460)).
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protection? Must the court, if no scienter is required, look to the penalty
to determine the need to infer a scienter requirement? Or does the court
look to the nature of the prohibited act to determine if it historically
required a reading of scienter? Again, the court, in the alternative, may
simply look to the nature of the act and the goods involved and declare
the "at peril" doctrine to apply.
Congress amended the MBTA in 1986 to require knowing violations
before the violator would be subject to criminal liability. 91 The question
thus arises, what will "knowingly" encompass in light of other environ-
mental criminal statutes decisions? It would seem that it will require
merely a general showing of intent to commit the prohibited act as in
ESA cases, rather than a specific intent. Additionally, knowledge of the
protected nature of the birds themselves most probably will not be
necessary.
IV. THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE
DoCTRINE
A. The Provisions
The recently enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act2 92 add more
confusion to criminal environmental prosecutions. The statute penalizes
"any person who knowingly" violates an implementation plan with a fine
or a maximum imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.2 93
Persons who "knowingly" falsify or fail to make appropriate reports are
subject to a fine or imprisonment of not more than two years, or both.
294
Knowing failure to pay fees owed is an offense subject to fine or impris-
onment for not more than one year, or both.295 Negligent release of a
hazardous air pollutant into the ambient air thereby "negligently" plac-
ing "another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily in-
jury" is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both.296 "Knowing" release of a hazardous air pollutant, coupled
with knowledge "at the time that he thereby places another person in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury" 297 is punishable by a
fine or imprisonment of not more than fifteen years, or both. A corpo-
291. Emergency Resources Wetlands Act § 501.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
293. Id. § 7413(c)(1).
294. Id. § 7413(c)(2).
295. Id § 7413(c)(3).
296. Id. § 7413(c)(4).
297. Id § 7413(c)(5)(A).
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rate defendant is subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000 per
violation.2 98
As in RCRA, knowledge requires proof of "actual awareness or ac-
tual belief possessed,"2 99 and "knowledge possessed by a person other
than the defendant... may not be attributed to the defendant."' 300 Addi-
tionally, circumstantial evidence, as in RCRA, may be used to prove ac-
tual knowledge, including avoidance.301
B. The Applicable Scope and Use of Scienter
Problems arise in determining the scope of applicability of the crimi-
nal provisions. The provisions are written in terms of "knowing" viola-
tions.30 2 Yet the applicability of the statute as to "operators" and
"persons" is delineated in terms of whether the violations were "knowing
and willful. ' 3 3 The statute does not contain enforcement provisions for
"knowing and willful" violations outside the definitional section qualify-
ing "operator" and "person."
A "person" is specifically defined as including "any responsible cor-
porate officer. ' ' 31 An "operator" is defined to include "any person who
is senior management personnel or a corporate officer."' 3 5 An "opera-
tor" does not include: "any person who is a stationary engineer or tech-
nician responsible for the operation, maintenance, repair, or monitoring
of equipment and facilities and who often has supervisory and training
duties but who is not senior management personnel or a corporate of-
ficer."'30 6 That definition of operator apparently applies to "knowing"
violations of sections 113(c)(1) through (5). However, in the case of
"knowing and willful" violations of the same statute, the exception
carved out will not apply; "operator" will not be so limited. 30 7 Appar-
ently the drafters anticipated charging a defendant with "knowing and
willful" violations, although the statute elsewhere contains no such en-
abling provision.
298. Id.
299. Id. § 7413(c)(5)(B)(i). In RCRA such provisions are restricted to "natural persons."
Id. § 6928(0(2).
300. Id § 7413(c)(5)(B)(ii).
301. Id § 7413(c)(5)(B). For the relevant text of the RCRA regulation, see supra note 250.
Note that the provisions defining when a person's state of mind is knowing provided in the
RCRA Special Rules are not included in the CAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(0(1).
302. Id § 7413(c)(1).
303. Id § 7413(h).
304. Id § 7413(c)(6).
305. Id § 7413(h).
306. Id.
307. Id.
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A "person," which includes "any responsible corporate officer," 308
excludes those who meet a two-pronged test in a "knowing" violation of
all sections except negligent endangerment. The test is that a "person"
shall not include an employee who is (1) carrying out his or her normal
activities and (2) is acting under orders from his or her employer.3°9
This test would seem to apply to responsible corporate officers as well,
offering them some shield. This specifically applies to the endangerment
provision in section 113(c)(5), as well as the minor violations of sections
113(c)(1), (2) and (3).
However, if the prosecution is for a "knowing and willful violation,"
this test does not apply.310 Again, the statutory definitions appear to
contemplate two types of criminal liability, "knowing" and "knowing
and willful," although there is no provision for the latter.
In negligent endangerment prosecutions, scope is again determined
by whether the prosecution is for a "knowing and willful" violation.
"Person" is subject to a different test for negligent endangerment applica-
tion. For a violation of subsection (c)(4), "person" will not include an
employee (1) who is carrying out his or her normal activities and (2) who
is not a part of senior management personnel or a corporate officer.31 1
This would seem to exclude the application of the exception to responsi-
ble corporate officers. The exception is inapplicable to any defendant if it
is a "knowing and willful" violation of (c)(4).312 Because subsection
(c)(4) is written only in negligence language, it is difficult to understand
how a "knowing and willful" prosecution would lie.
Commentators at this early stage have not yet remarked upon this
drafting technique nor indicated prosecutorial difficulties.313 Legislative
history further complicates the matter by including language that to
prove "knowing and willful," the government need not establish that the
defendant had specific knowledge of a violation of the Act. Knowledge
of the action as generally unlawful would suffice.31 4
This history is similar to language contained in the ESA legislative
history, but in that instance "willful" was deleted from the statute and
replaced by simply "knowingly" to establish general rather than specific
308. Id § 7413(c)(6).
309. Id § 7413(h).
310. Id
311. Id
312. Id
313. See Roady, supra note 2, at 10,201-02 for a discussion of the House and Senate con-
flicts regarding proposed amendments.
314. 136 CONG. REc. S16,952 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); see also Roady, supra note 2, at
10,202 (Senate intended to eliminate "acting under orders" defense of employees).
[Vol. 26:105
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL STATUTES
intent.315 In this instance, general intent is also the apparent goal but the
"willfully" language remains in the statute as well. Nonetheless, a show-
ing of general unlawfulness would be consistent with the Hoflin RCRA
decision.31 6 What is troublesome is the meaning of "willful" in the
statute.317
The technique of drafting the statute in a manner that determines
applicable scope by use of the words "knowing" or "knowing and will-
ful," traditionally employed in the criminal system to differentiate de-
grees of crime and the appropriate proof burdens for the government, is
also worrisome. Courts will be called upon to interpret the CAA within
the context of the public welfare doctrine as heretofore applied to crimi-
nal environmental statutes. Scienter, not a traditional element of the
public welfare doctrine, was forcibly annexed thereto by an earnest legis-
lative effort to punish and deter environmental crimes against an inno-
cent citizenry. Already weakened by generalization and inferences,
under the CAA "willfully" apparently will be attached to the staggering
public welfare doctrine in a fumbling legislative attempt to provide ap-
propriately severe criminal penalties.
Moreover, courts apparently will be asked to uphold "knowing and
willful" prosecutions under a criminal environmental statute that con-
tains no language for such violations. Claims to violations of constitu-
tional due process318 must surely rise from a criminal statute with such a
garbled warning of the consequences of prohibited behavior.319  The
mantle of congressional regulatory purpose will not suffice to permit a
two-tiered criminal liability scheme under a statute that does not specifi-
cally so provide. The public welfare doctrine, already strained, cannot
315. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
317. Given the legislative history of the Endangered Species Act on the deletion of "will-
fully," one might argue that the statute requires a more specific intent. See supra notes 216-17
and accompanying text.
318. See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Wulff, 758
F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985). These cases are discussed supra at notes 274-90 and accompanying
text.
319. An analysis of the scope of the corporate officer doctrine under the CAA is beyond the
purview of this paper. The leading case on this doctrine as applied to environmental statutes is
United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991). For a
detailed analysis of Dee, see Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowl-
edge Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 862, 871-81 (1991). Additionally, no attempt is made to evaluate necessity defenses
indicated as permissible under United States v. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 1991), and
anticipated by the drafters of the CAA when they included a section covering "[c]oncepts of
justification and excuse applicable." 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(D).
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serve as a source of legitimacy to an undelineated criminal liability stan-
dard, albeit conceived to protect the public weal.
V. CONCLUSION
Commentators have struggled to define the standard of intent to be
applied in environmental criminal prosecutions. 320  These regulatory
statutes have been deemed public welfare legislation.321  However,
knowledge was not a part of the public welfare doctrine. Indeed, the
doctrine developed through a judicially perceived need to validate con-
gressional efforts to protect the health and well-being of an innocent pub-
lic. Consistently, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
Constitution requires a reading of scienter only in crimes of common-law
origin, rejecting claims to require such a reading into public welfare
legislation.
The Supreme Court, from Balint to Park, has balanced the needs of
the public against harsh requirements for persons in a position to prevent
harm and effectuate a higher standard of care. The nature of the goods
handled has evoked a doctrine of "at peril" ramifications now generally
understood by modem society.
As the penalties under such legislation have grown more severe,
Congress has sought to protect the constitutionality of the criminal pen-
alties by requiring "knowledge." But is the operative function of
"knowledge" in criminal environmental statutes to be the preclusion of
constitutional due process challenges? The function of "knowledge" in
criminal environmental statutes imposing severe fines, lengthy jail
320. See Robert I. McMurry & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of
Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1133 (1986).
"[RCRA] statutory standard of liability, then, has been construed essentially as 'knew or
should have known;' although similar to a negligence test, it probably requires a more overt or
egregious lack of due care similar to a gross negligence test." Id at 1154; see also Barrett &
Clarke, supra note 319, at 888 (1991) (arguing that knowledge requirement should be inter-
preted broadly to protect public health); Christopher Harris et al., Criminal Liability for Viola-
tions of Federal Hazardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge" of Corporations and Their
Executives, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 203, 236 (1988) (discussing judicial split of opinion
regarding interpretation of knowledge requirement); Truxtun Hare, Comment, Reluctant
Soldiers The Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Negligent Violations of the Clean
Water Act, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 935, 951 (1990) (discussing expansion of negligence doctrine
under responsible corporate officer theory); Robert A. Milne, Note, The Mens Rea Require-
ments of the Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict Liability in Substance But Not Form, 37
BuFF. L. RV. 307, 330-31 (1988-89) (noting judicial retreat from strict liability formulation
for criminal environmental statutes).
321. See Stephen Herm, Comment, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws on Fed-
eral Facilities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 938, 958 n.143 (1991).
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sentences and felony stigma must be to give fair warning to potential
violators of the consequences of their action.
Public welfare offenses, by their nature, historically put the public
on notice of the possibility of penalty as a result of the nature of the
goods being handled by the actor. Thus, a statute with the requirement
of proof of knowledge of action is arguably contrary to the fundamental
basis of a public welfare statute: that no knowledge of the law is required
to impose a penalty. Under the public welfare doctrine, scienter is not
required. This is exactly the approach the courts have implicitly taken.
Generalized proof of knowledge has been accepted in an attempt to pe-
nalize the outrageously guilty. As long as one can rely on the discretion
of prosecutors and the good sense of juries, perhaps this is an acceptable
extension of the public welfare doctrine. However, as an eager Congress
rapidly creates more ambitious environmental statutes and more severe
penalties for violations, perhaps it is time to pause.322
Negligent and knowing endangerment violations of environmental
statutes are serious crimes. Such crimes are not unknown to penal codes
or the criminal justice system. But they are unknown to the public wel-
fare offense doctrine. Moreover, they are an inappropriate addition to
that doctrine by their very nature. As substantial crimes punishable by
substantial penalties, they are at odds with the philosophical basis of the
public welfare doctrine that condoned lack of scienter largely on the
grounds that the penalties were moderate. The purpose of environmental
statutes has also undergone considerable change, from mild police regu-
lation to more severe regulation for the betterment of society, and finally
to punishment as deterrence. The application of the public welfare doc-
trine to environmental crimes by importing a requirement of scienter ap-
pears at this juncture to have become a legal paradox.
Continued application of the public welfare doctrine to environmen-
tal crimes is no longer an appropriate extension of that theory. Congress
has created serious environmental crimes, not mere public welfare of-
fenses. Prosecution of environmental crimes should be recognized as
such, and concomitant judicial interpretation of the rights of defendants
must follow.
322. Criminal enforcement has been deemed a priority for the next decade. See James M.
Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the 1990s, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
916, 924-26 (1991).
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